LOUISVILLE — With its numbers depleted by nearly two-thirds in the early morning of its final session of a four-day docket, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy (ACSWP) gave approval in principle to perhaps its most controversial reports for the coming General Assembly. The committee was suffering from fatigue and attrition as it rushed through the preliminary drafts for two papers. The first was a resolution on Iraq to eventually be adopted by the General Assembly (GA), and the second was a background paper on America’s military and political involvement in Iraq, presumably to be received by the GA for study.
The committee attempted to give the drafts due attention as the clock ticked toward adjournment. The effort was hindered, however, by key members who had already headed home and others who departed for flights in mid-discussion. ACSWP member John Knapp, for instance, left behind extensive notes arguing for changed wording and intent in numerous places, but he was not there to press his case, having returned home the day before.
The effort was likewise hindered by uneven manuscripts.The draft of the Iraq resolution seemed particularly unready for public consumption. The drafts appraised at the meeting will undergo further revision before being sent to the GA—and for good reasons.
Advisors Donning the Advocacy Cape
The denominational staff member advising ACSWP, Coordinator Chris Iosso, took the lead in presenting and actually championing the Iraq resolution draft, which apparently he only recently had compiled from works by other writers. Initially, it appeared that the committee would be more concerned with style matters, such as sentence length, than with the draft’s overall message—a decidedly jaundiced interpretation of the Iraq war and its prosecution by their own government. However, after various committee members raised concerns about how best to formulate the rhetorical flow, ACSWP eventually touched on the substance of the message. Members appeared to support the liberal politics of the resolution, but pressed for rearranging and clarifying the wording, and toning down some overheated prose in places.
Apparently Iosso had recently sent drafts of both documents to ACSWP members by e-mail, requesting their critiques. From his comments, the written replies must have been few. In the meeting, however, several committee members proved conversant enough with the manuscripts to offer suggestions. Gloria Albrecht argued that “early paragraphs [in the Iraq resolution draft] introduce so many various ideas that they may get in the way and be distracting.” Pointing to a particular paragraph, for instance, she asked, “Why introduce a line of argumentation here?” However, Iosso pushed back in defense to the point that Albrecht eventually gave up, exasperated.
It was interesting to watch a staff member so greatly determine the kind of decisions and work normally expected to be done by the committee. Iosso assumed the role of advocating with a committee he normally would be expected to advise. More ironic—and perhaps indicative of a fundamental misunderstanding—is the fact that the very drafts being considered illustrated a case of an advisory committee straying into a self-appointed role of advocacy in respect to the General Assembly.
The General Assembly had not assigned an Iraq resolution to ACSWP as a project; the committee simply decided to interject itself in this way—as an advocate of a particular viewpoint not necessarily shared by fellow Presbyterians as a whole. Apparently the advocacy bent was becoming contagious!
What Distinct Voice Does ACSWP Add to the Many?
In the hurried time for consideration, Iosso did conscientiously work through John Knapp’s list of suggested changes to the drafts. Knapp seemed concerned about aspects of the overall message the resolution and study document would deliver. Unfortunately, Iosso worked off a document from Knapp that had not been reproduced for the committee or observers. Thus, complex arguments and rewordings from Knapp could only be read aloud prior to discussion and votes. This led to a strong sense of the committee members not being able to interact carefully with the items before them. The last-minute hurry diminished a sense of clear, informed decision making.
From what Iosso related of Knapp’s concerns, Knapp was looking for significant changes. He referred to the Iraq resolution draft as “a laundry list of topics, many of which are given only cursory attention.” He worried that the paper’s “theological content is thin,” and that “without a theologically informed rationale as the basis for our recommendations, we merely echo so many voices in the public square.”
Such observations could serve as generic criticism of many an ACSWP product!
Other ACSWP members systematically sought to add specificity and moderation to the documents. For instance, in one place the resolution called on an unknown authority “to restore, to rebuild, and to reconcile.” Members asked Iosso for specificity about who, exactly, is to restore, rebuild, and reconcile Iraq? It wasn’t clear.
Fundamental Questions Unraised
And so the process went, a combination of painstaking editing by committee and breathless, hit-and-miss consideration of two controversial papers. When the final papers are presented at General Assembly, they will in all likelihood vilify our own country’s military forces, international intentions, and political leadership. The thought was not “Should we even do this? Is this assessment entirely fair and correct? And what commends us as a group to offer such plenteous and self-sure political, military, and diplomatic advice?”
Each voice raised around the table seemed to assume that the critical direction the papers take is certainly justified, even obligatory. The major concern seemed to be to present the papers in the best package with the fewest red flags that could hinder swift approval. While Presbyterians as a whole differ greatly concerning political judgments as to how best to embody their faith in civic life, the resolution presumes to speak as if they all share a monolithic perspective. Here, once again, ACSWP’s ideological clubbiness failed to help the committee members articulate a variety of viewpoints wide enough to resemble the church.
Now What Happens?
By the time a vote was taken, the five remaining committee members of the twelve who began the meeting voted to go with the papers but have Iosso rework them, taking into account the numerous comments brought to the table that morning. He will send yet another set of drafts to the committee by e-mail. Then by e-mail and conference call, the committee will arrive at final drafts outside the public eye, presumably some time prior to the February 22 deadline for General Assembly business from denominational entities. The group shied away from publicly setting a date for their conference-call meeting.
The drafts’ loose ends remain plentiful, however. The ideological and even compositional hurdles loom high, especially for a rush job. While the General Assembly commissioners will likely receive somewhat improved documents, commissioners will probably end up considering papers ambitious and undisciplined in reach, disdainful of U.S. actions, cynical of our country’s intentions, heavy on amateur political science, and light in Reformed theology.
The study paper may yet be redeemable as a means to discuss the situation. The resolution, however, is a different matter. It presumably will be loaded with armchair commentary and simplistic answers for a nearly intractable situation far beyond the expertise of dabblers operating outside their realm of knowledge or authority.
There are some things that Presbyterians simply don’t have to say collectively, especially if they know too little and agree even less. These statements on Iraq could well prove to be a prime example.
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