The Center for Security Policy Occasional Paper Series
DEBATING THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN AMERICA
An Interview with DHS Advisor Mohamed Elibiary
Ryan Mauro, The Clarion Project
Made possible through the Institute for Religion & Democracy
Part II: Elibiary & the Muslim Brotherhood
Elibiary flatly states that he, nor any direct relative, is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood—but what does it mean to be a “member” of the Muslim Brotherhood? Groups known to be US Muslim Brotherhood entities use similar language.
It must be understood that the Muslim Brotherhood is more than a political party. It often refers to itself as the “Islamic Movement.” In the excellent Norwegian documentary, Freedom, Equality and the Muslim Brotherhood, the filmmaker and narrator, moderate Muslim Walid al-Kubaisi explains, “The Muslim Brothers’ leader says it is not essential that you are a registered member of the organization.”
A senior Brotherhood leader is then shown explaining his group’s presence in the West. He states that Brotherhood supporters do not have to declare themselves as members and should advance its agenda within the confines of the law when in non-Muslim countries. “Those who believe in the Muslim Brothers’ fundamental idea is a Muslim Brother… This person should serve the country he lives in and comply with the laws and regulations by the Muslim Brothers’ principles,” he says in the film.
I don’t know if Elibiary qualifies as a “member” or as a “Muslim Brother” but his strong affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood network in America and affinity for the “fundamental idea” of the Brotherhood should give us pause. At the very least, he’s a Muslim Brotherhood supporter and therefore, his position at the Department of Homeland Security should be unsettling for all Brotherhood foes.
Mauro: You have been accused of having connections to the Muslim Brotherhood by some members of Congress and media outlets here and overseas, like the Egyptian magazine Rose El-Youssef. What is your connection with the Muslim Brotherhood?
Elibiary: I granted one mainstream media interview to the Huffington Post last summer during Rep. Bachmann’s controversial public call upon the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General to investigate whether I might be influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.
In that interview, I publicly revealed that neither I, nor any direct relative of mine both here in the US and in Egypt, has ever been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood or has ever been an unindicted associate in any Muslim Brotherhood-related investigation either in the US or in Egypt. That includes all the Holy Land Foundation-associated investigations.
I was busy working in the private sector and starting my family pre-9/11, so I was not active within the Muslim community or played any role pre-9/11 with the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) or any other organization.
Plus, as the son of an Egyptian military officer, nephew of other Egyptian military academy officers and extended relative to yet other currently serving officers; my pedigree was certainly well-vetted for any Muslim Brotherhood connections by Egyptian intelligence agencies in the Sadat and Mubarak administrations which brutally suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. All that is in addition to the security vetting I received by the Department of Homeland Security, FBI and other intelligence community agencies when I received my US classified security clearance.
So, bottom line, I’m not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood or any other secret society out there for that matter. I simply find it counter-productive to American national security interests to treat the Muslim Brotherhood like the mafia, Nazi party, fascists, communists or any other entity we politically ostracize. Some have mistakenly interpreted my public messaging as pro-Islamist simply because it wasn’t anti-Islamist, but that is their mistake and not mine.
In the next question, you can see the fundamental disagreement between us regarding the Muslim Brotherhood. Elibiary states that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is non-violent and explicitly denies that it is jihadist.
He completely separates the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood from its Palestinian wing, Hamas. The difference is only circumstances. The Brotherhood follows a doctrine called “gradualism,” an incremental, adaptable approach towards jihad. In January, the Clarion Project reported on a video showing Hamas leaders pledging allegiance to the Brotherhood and, specifically, its jihad. And, of course, the American Muslim Brotherhood privately articulates its “work in America as a kind of grand jihad…in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within.”
It must be emphasized here that Elibiary’s views regarding the Muslim Brotherhood are part of the policy-making process. We are not engaging in an academic exploration of Islamism that is confined to a classroom.
Supporters of the US Muslim Brotherhood often deny its existence. Elibiary sets himself apart here by admitting that it has existed in America “for a very long time,” but is of no concern because it operates within the law.
Mauro: What is your view of the Muslim Brotherhood?
Elibiary: I do not view the Muslim Brotherhood as a single global syndicate or tanzim, as it is referred to in Arabic. Muslim Brotherhood members naturally exist everywhere at this point, but that’s not a problem in-and-of itself because there have been MB members inside the US abiding by the law for a very long time.
In every country, one can find areas of similarities amongst the MB-like or even affiliated Islamist movement there, but one can also find a great deal of differences driven by local dynamics in how they operate and what objectives they’re pursuing. Bottom line, there are many Muslim Brotherhoods and not necessarily one Global Muslim Brotherhood group. I am aware of different initiatives by MB over the decades to stand up to its international tanzim, as well as how some other nations’ MB have or continue to have influence over their tanzims residing here inside the US, but all these are minor efforts and not currently a threat to our national security.
MB in Egypt is a pragmatic, non-violent and generally pluralistic socio-political movement by Egyptian cultural standards. It is not accurate to paint MB-Egypt as dogmatic, violent or autocratic, much less more sensationalized terms like dictatorial, totalitarian or jihadist.
MB-Egypt is not entirely transparent, but that is not entirely its fault because it is operating within a police state. I believe that MB-Egypt will democratize and liberalize its decision-making gradually as the Egyptian state security services grant it more freedom to operate within the law as a civic non-governmental organization.
With only two years post the Mubarak era, I believe that MB and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, has by and large acted responsibly, if not always effectively, during the democratic transition period that Egypt is in the very early stages of.
While it will ultimately be up to the Egyptian people what form of governance and political system they want for their country, I believe we in the US should help them within limits as a neutral party. I do not and have never believed that democracy or any semblance of freedom for Egyptians would be possible without the political mainstreaming of the MB.
I am fully aware of how controversial my viewpoint is within certain circles. However, despite the hundreds of complaints public citizens have recently sent to the Department of Homeland Security, articles written in American and Egyptian media outlets, as well as complaints by certain Congressmen; I felt this was the right position for me to publicly express the past several months, as it became obvious Egypt was headed for a major crisis of governance.
Our country is the largest military aid supplier to Egypt, so we have a moral responsibility in my opinion as Americans to speak up when we see that military might being turned upon civilian Egyptian democracy advocates, be they secular or religious.
Currently I do not assess any national security concerns to the US homeland from the MB, but I can clearly see a political challenge for the United States and a geopolitical challenge for allies of ours in the neighborhood, such as Israel and the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia, should the MB succeed politically in Egypt. MB-Egypt is truly a grassroots organization and like many other similar social networks native to the Mediterranean region from southern Europe to North Africa, they are also a patronage network with a healthy appetite for hard negotiations.
Fresh from praising the Brotherhood in the passages above, Elibiary next comes down explicitly in favor of the disastrous Muslim Brotherhood-engagement policies put into practice by the Obama administration since its inception in 2009. What he proposes is a kind of foreign policy realism that would, in completely discounting the character of what is a thoroughly ideological movement, enlist the United States as the enabler of shariah-fueled anti-American movements worldwide.
Notice that, in the previous passage, Elibiary correctly cites the threat his suggested polices would be to to our current allies in the region; regardless, though, he presses for the advance of Islamists’ interests in the region.
Elibiary (cont’d): Some anti-Islamist US national security analysts attempt to pre-empt this dynamic by saying that we should disrupt or undermine the MB in Egypt through a variant of the Cold War’s containment strategy so we then wouldn’t have to deal with them in the future. I fall in the camp that believes this is a fool’s errand and misguided strategy that will end with the US undermining its already diminished leadership in the region.
So, ironically, to increase US influence in the post-Mubarak Egypt and safeguard American interests and allies in the region, our government needs to deepen our strategic engagement with MB to increase partnerships in areas of mutual benefit to both of our nations. As counter-intuitive and controversial in certain corners as that sounds, this strategy is what is best for our national interests and allies in the Middle East region a decade out and longer.
Part I: The Holy Land Foundation
Part II: Elibiary & the Muslim Brotherhood
Part III: Elibiary’s Relationship with American Islamists
Part V: US Policy (To be published tomorrow)
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